socrates: So can you name any other thing1 where the people who claim to teach it, so far from being acknowledged as capable of teaching anyone else, arenât even recognized as knowing anything about it themselvesâtheyâre actually thought to be especially bad at the very thing they claim to teach!âmeanwhile, the people who are acknowledged as decent men themselves canât make up their minds about whether or not it can be taught? And if theyâre so confused about it, do you think they could possibly be teaching it properly? meno: Absolutely not. s: So if sophists2 canât teach it, and people who are decent men themselves canât teach it, clearly nobody else could be teaching it? m: No. I donât think so. s: And if nobodyâs teaching it, then nobodyâs learning it, either? m: Thatâs right. s: And we already agreed that if thereâs something that nobody teaches, and nobody learns, then itâs something that canât be taught? m: Yes, we did. s: And thereâs no trace, anywhere, of anyone teaching people how to be good? m: Right. s: And if thereâs no one teaching it, thereâs no one learning it? m: Apparently not. s: So it looks like being good is something that canât be taught? m: It looks that wayâif weâve thought it through correctly; which makes me wonder, Socrates, if maybe there arenât even any good men at all! Or, how on earth do people become good, if and when they do? s: Chances are, Meno, you and I are a couple of rather ordinary men. Iâm afraid our teachersâGorgias in your case, and in my case, Prodicus3âhavenât educated us well enough. So weâve definitely got to take a good look at ourselves and find out whoâs going to make us better, somehow or other. And Iâm saying that with this search of ours in mind: what idiots weâve been! How silly of us not to realize that it isnât always knowledge thatâs guiding people when they do things well and succeed in their affairs. Thatâs probably why the answer keeps getting away from usâI mean, the discovery of how exactly good men become good. m: How do you mean, Socrates? s: Hereâs what I mean. We were right to agree that men who are good also always do goodâwerenât we? Thatâs got to be right? m: Yes. s: And we were also right to agree that good men will do us good if they guide us in our affairs and âshow us the wayâ? m: Yes. s: But the claim that you can only show people the way if you have wisdomâit looks like we were wrong to agree on that. m: What makes you say that? s: Well, Iâll tell you. Lookâsuppose someone knew the way to Larissa4 (or wherever) and was on his way there, and showing other people how to get there; obviously heâd be good at showing them the right way? m: Of course. s: And what about someone who had an opinion on how to get thereâa correct opinionâbut whoâd never actually been there, and didnât know how to get there; wouldnât he be able to show them the way as well? m: Of course. s: And presumably as long as he has his correct opinion (about the same thing the other man has knowledge of), heâll be every bit as good at showing people the way? With his true belief, but without knowledge, heâll be just as good a guide as the man with the knowledge? m: Yes, heâll be just as good. s: In other words, true opinion is just as good a guide to right action as knowledge. Thereâs the key fact that we kept leaving out, just now, when we were looking into the nature of being good. We said that wisdom was the only thing that can show us how to do things the right way. But thatâs not so. Thereâs also true opinion. m: Yes, it certainly looks like it. s: So in other words, a correct opinion does just as much good as knowledge? m: Except in one respect, Socrates. If you have knowledge, then youâll always be dead on target; but if you only have a correct opinion, sometimes youâll hit, and some- times youâll miss. s: What makes you say that? If youâve always got the correct opinion, wonât you always be âon targetâ as long as youâve got your correct opinion? m: Yes, good point ⊠it seems that must be right; which leaves me wondering, Socrates: If thatâs the case, why on earth is knowledge so much more valuable than correct opinion, and why are they treated as two different things? s: Well, you know why it is youâre wondering about it? Shall I tell you? m: Go ahead. s: Itâs because you havenât pondered Daedalusâs5 statues. Maybe you havenât even got any up there in Thessaly.6 m: What have they got to do with it? s: Well, theyâre the same: if they arenât shackled, they escapeâthey scamper away. But if theyâre shackled, they stay put. m: What are you getting at? s: If you own an original Daedalus, unshackled, itâs not worth all that muchâlike a slave who keeps running awayâbecause it doesnât stay put. But if youâve got one thatâs shackled, itâs very valuable. Because theyâre really lovely pieces of work. What am I getting at? My point is, itâs the same with true opinions. True opinions, as long as they stay put, are a fine thing and do us a whole lot of good. Only, they tend not to stay put for very long. Theyâre always scampering away from a personâs soul. So theyâre not very valuable until you shackle them by figuring out what makes them true. (And that, my dear Meno, is a matter of remembering, as we agreed earlier.) And then, once theyâre shackled, they turn into knowledge, and become stable and fixed. So thatâs why knowledge is a more valuable thing than correct opinion, and thatâs how knowledge differs from a correct opinion: by a shackle. m: You know, I bet thatâs pretty much right, Socrates. s: Of course, Iâm speaking as someone who doesnât have knowledge myself. Iâm just guessing. But I certainly donât think itâs only a guess that correct opinion and knowledge are two very different things. If thereâs anything at all Iâd claim to knowâand I wouldnât claim to know a lotâIâd certainly count that as one of the things I know for sure. m: And youâre quite right to, Socrates. s: So tell me: Am I also right in saying that if true opinion is guiding you, itâs just as good as knowledge at achieving the goal of any sort of action? m: Yes, I think thatâs right as well. s: So correct opinion is just as good a thing as knowledge and does us just as much good in our actions; and a man with correct opinions will do as much good as a man with knowledge? m: Right. s: And we agreed that that was a characteristic of a good manâdoing good? m: Yes. s: So it isnât just knowledge that makes men good, and able to do their cities good, if and when they do; itâs also correct opinion. In which case, given that neither one of those thingsâknowledge or true opinionâarises in people just by nature ⊠or am I wrong about that? Do you think either of them comes to us naturally? m: No. s: So if neither of them comes naturally, it canât be peopleâs nature that makes them good men? m: No, it canât be. s: And since our nature doesnât make us good ⊠the next thing we asked was whether being good is something teachable? m: Yes. s: Right, and didnât we decide that being good is teachable if itâs a kind of wisdom? m: Yes. s: And conversely, that it would have to be a kind of wisdom, if itâs teachable? m: Exactly. s: And that if there are people teaching it, then itâs teachable; but if there arenât any people teaching it, then it isnât teachable? m: Thatâs right. s: And weâve decided that there arenât any people teaching it? m: We did. s: So that means weâve decided that it isnât teachable, and that it isnât a kind of wisdom? m: Exactly. s: But weâre certainly agreeing that itâs a good thing? m: Yes. s: And that whatâs goodâwhat does us goodâis the element that guides us and shows us the right way? m: Absolutely. s: And that there are only two things that can show us the right way: true opinion and knowledge. At least, thatâs what a person has to have, to show the way. I donât count things that come out right just by some stroke of luck. Thatâs not a case of anything happening through human guidance. In any area where people show the way, those are the only possible guides: true opinion and knowledge. m: I think thatâs right. s: And since being good is something that canât be taught, itâs no longer an option that itâs knowledge? m: Apparently not. s: So of the only two things that are good, and that enable us to do good, that rules out knowledge: it seems it isnât knowledge that guides people in the civic and ethical sphere. m: I agree. s: So in other words it wasnât through having knowledge, or by being experts, that men like that were able to guide their citiesâmen like Themistocles7 and the ones Anytus8 was talking about. Of course! Thatâs why they couldnât turn other people into the sort of men they were themselvesâbecause it wasnât knowledge that made them the way they were. m: That seems very plausible, Socrates. s: So if it wasnât knowledge that made them the way they were, the only remaining possibility is that it was a sort of knack for having the right opinions. Thatâs what statesmen must use to set their cities on the right path; and that means theyâre just like fortune-tellers and soothsayers, in terms of how close they are to having knowledge. Soothsayers are the same: when theyâre âinspiredâ they say plenty of things that are true; but they donât really know what theyâre saying. m: Yes, thatâs probably right. s: And isnât it right to call people âinspiredâ when they achieve lots of great things by what they say and do, without any understanding? m: Absolutely. s: So it makes sense to call those people inspired: the fortune-tellers and soothsayers; and poets and playwrights, too; and weâd be especially right to call statesmen inspired, and to say theyâre in a kind of trance, possessed by some divine spirit, when they achieve so many great successes by saying the things they say, even though they donât really know what theyâre talking about. m: Absolutely. s: And remember that women, Meno, call good men âinspiredâ; and in Sparta,9 too, the highest praise for a good man is when they say, âThat manâs inzpired.â10 m: And apparently theyâre right, Socrates. Mind you, Anytus here will probably get annoyed with you for saying so. s: I donât care about that. Weâll talk with him again some other time, Meno. As for us, here and nowâif weâve done a good job of our search for the truth, and if what weâve said at each stage of our talk was right, then it turns out that being good is not something that comes to us naturally, or something that can be taught; instead, it seems it arises by gift of god, and without understanding, in the people who have it ⊠unless, that is, there were a man, among good statesmen, who could also turn someone else into the sort of man he is himself. If there were such a man, theyâd probably speak of him as being up here among the living just what Homer says Tiresias was among the dead. He says, He alone has sense in the world below;11 the rest are flitting shadows. A man like that would be the same thing here: something real, among mere shadows of what it is to be good. m: I think thatâs quite right, and very nicely put, Socrates. s: So by our line of reasoning, Meno, it appears that being good is a quality that comes to people, when it does, by gift of god. Of course, we really wonât know for sure until we set aside the question of exactly how it comes to people and first try to find out what being good is, in itself. But now itâs time for me to go. And as for you, try to convince your host Anytus here about the things youâve been convinced about yourselfâtry to calm him down. If you can do that, you may well be doing Athens a favour.