Argument
There is a necessary connection between thinking something wrong and being at least somewhat motivated to avoid doing it. But the cognitivist cannot explain that connection. So cognitivism is false
Premises
- When you express a moral judgement, its necessarily connected with a motivational state (disproval, disgust, etc). (See Motive Internalism)
- Cognitivism must allow some claims to not be connected with a motivational state
Conclusion
Therefore, when you express a moral judgement, you don’t express a claim
Counterarguments
Reject Premise 1
Disprove premise 1. Explain that moral belief do not need to be Motive Internalized Counterexample:
- Etiquette. You can say this is rude in one culture, but I don’t hold that motivation. You make sincere judgements about what is right or wrong, but you don’t feel any responsibility to live up to those standards of other cultures.
- Provide a moral statement that has no motivation. In other words, there must be a moral agent, that is well and truly indifferent to morality, but still believe in moral rules. Example: “It is morally wrong to kill, but I don’t care”. Hitmen may believe in morality, but they genuinely not care. (See Amoralism)
Reject Premise 2
Disprove premise 2. It is not possible that belief can never motivate
- Moral claims necessarily motivate (at least somewhat)